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ABSTRACT
Relationship-based access control (ReBAC) is a flexible and ex-
pressive framework that allows policies to be expressed in terms
of chains of relationship between entities as well as attributes of
entities. ReBAC policy mining algorithms have a potential to sig-
nificantly reduce the cost of migration from legacy access control
systems to ReBAC, by partially automating the development of a
ReBAC policy. Existing ReBAC policy mining algorithms support
a policy language with a limited set of operators; this limits their
applicability.
This paper presents a ReBAC policy mining algorithm designed
to be both (1) easily extensible (to support additional policy lan-
guage features) and (2) scalable. The algorithm is based on Bui et
al.’s evolutionary algorithm for ReBAC policy mining algorithm.
First, we simplify their algorithm, in order to make it easier to
extend and provide a methodology that extends it to handle new
policy language features. However, extending the policy language
increases the search space of candidate policies explored by the
evolutionary algorithm, thus causes longer running time and/or
worse results. To address the problem, we enhance the algorithm
with a feature selection phase. The enhancement utilizes a neural
network to identify useful features. We use the result of feature
selection to reduce the evolutionary algorithm’s search space. The
new algorithm is easy to extend and, as shown by our experiments,
is more efficient and produces better policies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In relationship-based access control (ReBAC), access control policies
are expressed in terms of chains of relationships between enti-
ties. This increases expressiveness and often allows more natural
policies. High-level access control policy models such as attribute-
based access control (ABAC) and ReBAC are becoming increasingly
widely adopted, as security policies become more dynamic and
more complex. ABAC is already supported by many enterprise
software products, using a standardized ABAC language such as
XACML or a vendor-specific ABAC language. Forms of ReBAC
are supported in popular online social network systems and are
starting to emerge in other software systems as well.
High-level policy models such as ReBAC allow for concise and
flexible policies and promise long-term cost savings through re-
duced management effort. However, the initial cost of developing
a ReBAC policy to replace an existing lower-level policy can be a
significant barrier to adoption of ReBAC. Policy mining algorithms
promise to drastically reduce this cost, by automatically produce
a “first draft” of a high-level policy from existing lower-level data.
There is a substantial amount of research on role mining, surveyed
in [8, 17], and a small but growing literature on ABAC policymining
[7, 14, 16, 18, 22, 23], surveyed in [8].
Bui et al. proposed a problem of ReBAC policy mining [4, 6]:
given information about subjects, resources, and other objects, and
the set of currently granted permissions, find a ReBAC policy that
grants the same permissions using high-level rules. For realistic
datasets, the search space of possible policies is enormous. In tra-
ditional ABAC languages, such as XACML, each expression in-
volves at most one attribute dereference, e.g., subject.department,
where subject (the entity making the access request) is a User, and
User.department is the user’s department affiliation. In ReBAC, an
expression may contain a path involving several attributes, and
the search space grows exponentially in the path length. For ex-
ample, Bui et al.’s ReBAC policy for healthcare contains the ex-
pression resource.record.patient.treatingTeam, where resource (the
entity to which access is requested) is an Entry in an electronic
health record, Entry.record is the HealthRecord containing the en-
try, HealthRecord.patient is the patient that the health record is for,
and Patient.treatingTeam is the clinical team treating the patient.
Bui et al. also proposed a ReBAC policy language, called ORAL
(Object-oriented Relationship-basedAccess-control Language), which
formulates ReBAC as an object-oriented extension of ABAC. Rules
are built from atomic conditions, which involve a single object (e.g.,
subject.department=’ComputerScience’) and atomic constraints, which
relate two objects (e.g., subject.department=resource.department).
Relationships are expressed using attributes that refer to other ob-
jects, and path expressions are used in conditions and constraints to
follow chains of relationships between objects.
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Bui et al. developed two ReBAC policy mining algorithms [4,
6]. Their greedy algorithm uses heuristics to construct and then
generalize candidate rules, attempts to merge and simplify the
candidate rules, and then selects the best ones to include in the
final policy. Their Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) re-uses part of the
greedy algorithm to construct some candidate rules, and then uses
evolutionary searches starting from the candidate rules to find
improved rules to include in the final policy.
This paper proposes a new algorithm for ReBAC policy min-
ing that builds on and improves Bui et al.’s EA. We build on EA
because it performs better overall than their greedy algorithm in
their experiments, and because it is easier to extend, as discussed
below. Our algorithm, called FS-SEA*, has two phases, enclosed in
an outer loop that iterates until a complete policy has been gener-
ated (the “*” in the name indicates this iteration). The first phase,
called feature selection (FS) identifies a relatively small set of atomic
conditions and atomic constraints that are likely to be “useful”,
i.e., to appear in the desired ReBAC rules; we call these useful fea-
tures. Our feature selection algorithm is based on machine learning,
specifically, neural networks (NNs). We chose NNs over other AI
classification methods due to their flexibility and their scalability to
high-dimensional data and large datasets. NNs are good at implic-
itly learning high-level features, including the interactions between
multiple input features, whereas other classifiers such as SVM often
require manual feature engineering to achieve high classification
accuracy. The second phase, called simplified evolutionary algorithm
(SEA), is a simplified version of EA that is also modified to consider
only rules built from the useful features identified in the first phase.
Our feature selection phase could easily be added to other policy
mining algorithms as well.
FS-SEA*’s advantages over EA include extensibility, efficiency,
and effectiveness, as discussed next.
Extensibility. Extending FS-SEA* to handle extensions to the pol-
icy language is much easier than extending EA, especially when
extending the language with additional operators that can appear
in constraints. EA’s first phase (and Bui et al.’s greedy algorithm)
contains rule generalization step that attempts to generalize initially
constructed candidate rules by removing conditions and adding con-
straints. This step computes a set of candidate atomic constraints
to possibly include in the rule, and then performs a relatively costly
(worst-case exponential) search to find the optimal subset of them
to include in the rule. Increasing the set of possible constraints, by
adding more operators, significantly increases the cost of this step.
We simplify EA by removing the rule generalization step. Instead,
SEA relies on the evolutionary search to find appropriate generaliza-
tions of the candidate rules in the initial population. Note that this
step cannot simply be removed from the greedy algorithm, which
contains no other mechanism that can serve the same purpose.
To show that SEA works as well as EA—in other words, that
this simplification has no ill effects—we ran SEA and EA on several
policies used in [6], and found that the algorithms give similar
results (see Section 5).
To show that FS-SEA* is easy to extend, we provide general
guidelines for extending it, and illustrate them by supporting two
constraint operators not considered by Bui et al.: set-equality (i.e.,
equality between sets; the equality operator in [6] is applied only
to primitive values, not sets, in constraints) and subseteq.
Efficiency and Effectiveness. Evolutionary algorithms are based
on randomized search and therefore intrinsically involve a trade-
off between efficiency (running time) and effectiveness (quality of
results). It is usually possible to get better results, at the expense of
longer running time, simply by increasing the limit on the number
of search steps.
To show that feature selection significantly improves the efficiency-
effectiveness trade-off (or “cost-benefit ratio”), we developed a pseu-
dorandom synthetic policy generator to produce a variety of policies
that use the two new operators mentioned above as well as the
existing operators in ORAL, ran SEA and FS-SEA* on the synthetic
policies, with the same limit on the number of search steps in both
algorithms, and found that FS-SEA* was significantly faster and
achieved significantly better results.
Both of these benefits resulted from feature selection success-
fully focusing the evolutionary search on the most promising part
of the search space, preventing it from wasting time exploring less
promising parts. It is obvious how this leads to better results. It also
leads to smaller running time, because SEA generates lower-quality
rules that, on average, each cover fewer of the permissions granted
by the given low-level access control policy, hence it needs to gen-
erate more rules, and this takes longer (a more detailed explanation
is in Section 8). As the policy language is further extended, and the
search space grows further, it is expected that the benefits of using
feature selection to focus the search will also increase.
To show the benefits of performing feature selection multiple
times, we also ran experiments comparing FS-SEA* with a simpler
version called FS-SEA1 that omits the outer loop mentioned above,
and calls FS and SEA only once. We found that the use of iteration
in FS-SEA* yields slight to moderate improvements in the results,
at the expense of a small increase in running time.
2 POLICY LANGUAGE
We adopt Bui et al.’s ORAL (Object-oriented Relationship-based
Access-control Language) [6], with some extensions, as our policy
language. We give a brief overview of ORAL and refer the reader
to [6] for details. We also describe two new constraint operators,
namely subseteq and set equality, that we add to ORAL as illustra-
tive language extensions.
Our main contribution—namely, our feature selection technique
and accompanying empirical demonstration of its benefits—treats
policy language constructs as features in a generic way, and can
easily handle additional extensions to ORAL and be used with other
ABAC or ReBAC policy languages.We include an overview of ORAL
here to make this paper more self-contained and, more importantly,
to emphasize ORAL’s expressiveness. The expressiveness of the
policy language, and the consequent vastness of the search space
of possible policies, makes the policy mining problem especially
challenging and drives the need for new techniques to improve the
scalability and effectiveness of policy mining algorithms.
A ReBAC policy is a tuple π = ⟨CM,OM,Act, Rules⟩, where CM
is a class model, OM is an object model, Act is a set of actions, and
Rules is a set of rules.
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A class model is a set of class declarations. Each field has a type,
which is a class name or “Boolean”, and a multiplicity, which speci-
fies how many values may be stored in the field and is “one” (also
denoted “1”), “optional” (also denoted “?”), or “many” (also denoted
“*”, meaning any number). Boolean fields always have multiplicity
1. Every class implicitly contains a field “id” with type String and
multiplicity 1. A reference type is any class name (used as a type).
Bui et al. allow inheritance between classes. We do not consider
inheritance in this paper but plan to consider it in future work.
An object model is a set of objects whose types are consistent with
the class model and with unique values in the id fields. Let type(o)
denote the type of object o. The value of a field with multiplicity
“many” is a set. The value of a field with multiplicity “optional” may
be a single value or the placeholder ⊥ indicating absence of a value.
A path is a sequence of field names, written with “.” as a sepa-
rator. A condition is a set, interpreted as a conjunction, of atomic
conditions. An atomic condition is a tuple ⟨p, op, val⟩, where p is a
non-empty path, op is an operator, either “in” or “contains”, and
val is a constant value, either an atomic value or a set of atomic
values. For example, an object o satisfies ⟨dept.id, in, {CompSci}⟩
if the value obtained starting from o and following (dereferencing)
the dept field and then the id field equals CompSci. For readabil-
ity, we usually write conditions with a logic-based syntax, using
“∈” for “in” and “∋” for “contains”. For example, we may write
⟨dept.id, in, {CompSci}⟩ as dept.id ∈ {CompSci}. We may use “=”
as syntactic sugar for “in” when the constant is a singleton set; thus,
the previous example may be written as dept.id=CompSci.
A constraint is a set, interpreted as a conjunction, of atomic con-
straints. Informally, an atomic constraint expresses a relationship
between the requesting subject and the requested resource, by re-
lating the values of paths starting from each of them. An atomic
constraint is a tuple ⟨p1, op,p2⟩, where p1 and p2 are paths (possibly
the empty sequence), and op is one of the following four oper-
ators: equal, in, contains, supseteq, subseteq. Implicitly, the first
path is relative to the requesting subject, and the second path is
relative to the requested resource. The empty path represents the
subject or resource itself. For example, a subject s and resource r
satisfy ⟨specialties, contains, topic⟩ if the set s .specialties contains
the value r .topic.
For readability, we usually write constraints with a logic-based
syntax, using “=” for “equal” and “⊇” for “supseteq”, and we pre-
fix the subject path p1 and resource path p2 with “subject” and
“resource”, respectively. For example, ⟨specialties, contains, topic⟩
may be written as subject.specialties ∋ resource.topic.
A rule is a tuple ⟨ subjectType, subjectCondition, resourceType,
resourceCondition, constraint, actions ⟩, where subjectType and re-
sourceType are class names, subjectCondition and resourceCondition
are conditions, constraint is a constraint, actions is a set of actions.
A rule must satisfy several well-formedness requirements [6]. For
a rule ρ = ⟨st , sc, rt , rc, c,A⟩, let sType(ρ) = st , sCond(ρ) = sc ,
rType(ρ) = rt , rCond(ρ) = rc , con(ρ) = c , and acts(ρ) = A.
For readability, we may prefix paths with “subject” or “resource”,
to indicate the object from which the path starts. For example, the
e-document case study [6, 9] involves a large bankwhose policy con-
tains the rule: A project member can read all sent documents regard-
ing the project. This is expressed as ⟨ Employee, subject.employer.id
= LargeBank, Document, true, subject.workOn.relatedDoc ∋ re-
source, {read}⟩, where Employee.workOn is the set of projects the
employee is working on, and Project.relatedDoc is the set of sent
documents related to the project.
The type of a pathp (relative to a specified class), denoted type(p),
is the type of the last field in the path. Given a class model, object
model, object o, and path p, let nav(o,p) be the result of navigating
(a.k.a. following or dereferencing) path p starting from object o. The
result might be no value, represented by ⊥, an atomic value, or (if
a field in p has multiplicity many) a set of values. This is like the
semantics of path navigation in UML’s Object Constraint Language.
An object o satisfies an atomic condition c = ⟨p, op, val⟩, denoted
o |= c , if (op = in ∧ nav(o,p) ∈ val) ∨ (op = contains ∧ nav(o,p) ∋
val). Objects o1 and o2 satisfy an atomic constraint c = ⟨p1, op,p2⟩,
denoted ⟨o1,o2⟩ |= c , is defined in a similar way. An SRA-tuple is a
tuple ⟨s, r ,a⟩, where the “subject” s and “resource” r are objects, and
a is an action, representing (depending on the context) authorization
for s to perform a on r or a potential request to perform that access.
An SRA-tuple ⟨s, r ,a⟩ satisfies a rule ρ = ⟨st , sc, rt , rc, c,A⟩, denoted
⟨s, r ,a⟩ |= ρ, if type(s) = st∧s |= sc∧type(r ) = rt∧r |= rc∧⟨s, r ⟩ |=
c ∧ a ∈ A. The meaning of a rule ρ, denoted [[ρ]], is the set of SRA-
tuples that satisfy it. The meaning of a ReBAC policy π , denoted
[[π ]], is the union of the meanings of its rules.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
We adopt Bui et al.’s definition of the ReBAC mining problem. We
repeat the core parts of the definition here, and refer the reader to
[6] for additional description and details.
An access control list (ACL) policy is a tuple ⟨CM,OM,Act,AU ⟩,
where CM is a class model, OM is an object model, Act is a set of
actions, andAU ⊆ OM×OM×Act is a set of SRA tuples representing
authorizations. Conceptually, AU is the union of the access control
lists.
An ReBAC policy π is consistent with an ACL policy ⟨CM,OM,
Act, AU ⟩ if they have the same class model, object model, actions,
and [[π ]] = AU .
Among the many ReBAC policies consistent with a given ACL
policy π0, the most desirable ones are those that satisfy the follow-
ing two criteria. One criterion is that the “id” field should be avoided
when possible, because policies that use this field are (to that extent)
identity-based, not attribute-based or relationship-based. Therefore,
the “id” field should be used only when necessary, i.e., only when
every ReBAC policy consistent with π0 uses it. The other, more
generic, criterion is that the policy should have the best quality
as measured by a given policy quality metric Qpol, expressed as a
function from ReBAC policies to the natural numbers, with small
numbers indicating high quality. This is natural for metrics based
on policy size, which is the most common choice.
The ReBAC policy mining problem is: given an ACL policy π0 =
⟨CM,OM,Act,AU ⟩ and a policy quality metricQpol, find a set Rules
of rules such that the ReBAC policy π = ⟨CM,OM,Act, Rules⟩ is
consistent with π0, uses the “id” field only when necessary, and has
the best quality, according to Qpol, among such policies.
The policy quality metric that our algorithm aims to optimize
is weighted structural complexity (WSC), a generalization of policy
size first introduced for RBAC policies [19] and later extended
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to ReBAC [6]. Minimizing policy size is consistent with usability
studies showing that more concise access control policies are more
manageable [2]. WSC is a weighted sum of the numbers of primitive
elements of various kinds that appear in a rule or policy. WSC is
defined bottom-up. The WSC of an atomic condition ⟨p, op, val⟩ is
|p | + |val |, where |p | is the length of path p, and |val | is 1 if val is an
atomic value and is the cardinality of val if val is a set. TheWSC of
an atomic constraint ⟨p1, op,p2⟩ is |p1 | + |p2 |. The WSC of a rule ρ,
denoted WSC(ρ), is the sum of the WSCs of the atomic conditions
and atomic constraints in it, plus the cardinality of the action set
(more generally, it is a weighted sum of those numbers, but we take
all of the weights to be 1). The WSC of a ReBAC policy π , denoted
WSC(π ), is the sum of the WSC of its rules.
4 FEATURE SELECTION (FS)
A feature is a subject atomic condition, resource atomic condition,
or atomic constraint satisfying the user-specified limits on lengths
of paths in conditions and constraints. We define a mapping from
feature vectors to Boolean labels: given an SRA-tuple ⟨s, r ,a⟩, we
create a feature vector (i.e., a vector of the Boolean values of features
evaluated for subject s and resource r ) and map it to true if the
SRA-tuple is permitted (i.e., is in AU ) and to false otherwise. We
represent Booleans as integers: 0 for false, and 1 for true. We train a
NN to learn this classification (labeling) of feature vectors. We then
analyze the weights learned in the NN to quantify how “useful”
(important) each feature is in determining the NN’s output. We
then rank the features according to their usefulness and classify
the highest-ranked features as “useful features”.
We decompose the problem by learning useful features separately
for each tuple consisting of a subject type, a resource type, and an
action. Specifically, we learn a separate neural network NNCs ,Cr ,a
to classify SRA-tuples with subject type Cs , resource type Cr , and
action a. We do this for each ⟨Cs ,Cr ,a⟩ such that AU contains
some SRA-tuple with a subject of type Cs , a resource of type Cr ,
and action a. The inputs to NNCs ,Cr ,a are limited to the features
appropriate for subject type Cs and resource type Cr , e.g., the path
in the subject condition starts with a field in class Cs . The set of
labeled feature vectors used to trainNNCs ,Cr ,a contains an element
generated from each possible combination of a subject of type Cs
(in the given object model) and resource of type Cr . We modify
SEA so that, when initially constructing rules that cover SRA-tuples
with a particular subject type Cs , resource type Cr , and action a, it
uses only the features classified as useful based on the edge weights
in NNCs ,Cr ,a .
This decomposition is justified by the fact that all SRA-tuples
authorized by the same rule must contain subjects with the same
subject type and resources with the same resource type. A rule can
authorize SRA-tuples with different actions, since the last compo-
nent of a rule is a set of actions. SEA initially learns rules containing
a single action; at the end, it attempts to merge similar rules with
different actions into a single rule authorizing multiple actions.
As an optimization, we discard a feature if it has the same truth
value in all of the labeled feature vectors used to train a NN; for
example, if all instances of some type C in the given object model
have the same value for a field f , then atomic conditions on field f
will be discarded.
We also detect sets of equivalent features, which are features that
have same truth value in all feature vectors labeled true and used
to train a NN. For each set of equivalent features, we keep only the
features with the lowest WSC, and discard the rest. The discarded
features should not be used in the mined policy, because any rule
using them would have unnecessarily high WSC.
4.1 Neural Network Architecture and Training
Input 
node x0
Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer
Wx→ z
Wz→ p
Input 
node x1
Input 
node x2
Hidden 
node z0
Hidden
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Output 
node p0
Output 
node p1
Figure 1: Architecture of the 2-layer neural network.
We use a 2-layer NN architecture. The input layer contains an
input node xi corresponding to each feature in the feature vector.
The hidden layer contains hidden nodes zi that help the NN repre-
sent more complex, nonlinear classifiers. The hidden nodes use the
popular rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation function [13]:
zi = max(0,ai ) (1)
where the input ai to hidden node zi is a weighted sum of the
values x j of the input nodes: ai =
∑
j wx j→zi x j , wherewx j→zi is
the weight of the connection from input node x j to hidden node
zi . Finally, the output layer contains two output nodes pi , each
associated with an access decision:p0 with deny, andp1 with permit.
The activation function for the output nodes is softmax, a common
choice for NNs used as classifiers:
pi =
ebi
eb0 + eb1
(2)
where the input bi to output node pi is a weighted sum of the
values zj of the hidden nodes: bi =
∑
j wzj→pi zj , where wzj→pi
is the weight of the connection from hidden node zj to output
node pi . Note that b0 is considered the (main) input to p0, even
though b1 is also used in the computation of p0, because b1 is
merely used for normalization. The outputs p0 and p1 are estimates
of the probability that the input should be classified as denied or
permitted, respectively. The classification decision is the one with
higher probability: permit iff p1 > p0, and deny iff p0 > p1. If
p0 = p1, the feature vector is unclassified.
The training objective is to minimize the cross-entropy for the
two classes (i.e., decisions):
L =
∑
n
−w0 · yn0 · log(pn0 ) −w1 · yn1 · log(pn1 ) (3)
Efficient and Extensible Policy Mining for Relationship-Based Access Control SACMAT ’19, June 3–6, 2019, Toronto, ON, Canada
where n indexes the training inputs, each consisting of a feature
vector vn and its label ℓn , and where ⟨yn0 ,yn1 ⟩ is ⟨1, 0⟩ if ℓn = 0
and is ⟨0, 1⟩ if ℓn = 1. This objective function (a.k.a. loss function)
reaches its absolute minimum, which is zero, when ⟨yn0 ,yn1 ⟩ =⟨pn0 ,pn1 ⟩ for all n, i.e., when the NN’s outputs exactly match the
label for each feature vector instance. We define the weightswi in
the loss function in a way that compensates for the fact that our
training data contains many fewer positive instances than negative
instances: w1 = (N − N1)/N and w0 = 1 − w1, where N is the
number of training inputs to this NN, and N1 is the number of
training inputs to this NN with label ℓn = 1.
We train the neural network using standard backpropagation,
with ADADELTA [24], an adaptive learning rate method, as the
optimization algorithm. For ADADELTA’s hyperparameters, we
use the default values in the PyTorch implementation ϵ = 10−6
and ρ = 0.9. We continue training until all inputs are correctly
classified (and no inputs are unclassified) or a specified limit Ntr
on the number of training iterations is reached. We originally used
stochastic gradient descent as the optimization algorithm, but it
required manual tuning of the learning rate and still took longer to
learn an accurate classifier.
We experimented other NN architectures and training algorithm.
We tried other activation functions, such as LeakyReLU for the
hidden layer, and sigmoid for the hidden layer and output layer.
For the optimization algorithm when training the network with
backpropagation, we tried Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). With
these variations, it took longer to learn an accurate classifier. We
also tried NNs with multiple hidden layers. These more complex
NNs did not help the system learn an accurate classifier faster and
would have required a more complex analysis to identify useful
features.
4.2 Useful Feature Selection
We rank features using the following score that measures howmuch
each feature contributes to each output, based on the weights on
the paths in the NN from the associated input node to each output
node. The score is computed in two steps.
First, compute the contribution of each hidden node z to a permit
outcome as s1z = wz→p1 −wz→p0 , and its contribution to a deny
outcome as s0z = wz→p0 −wz→p1 . We use the difference between
the weights to the two output nodes, because the difference in
the output values determines the outcome (i.e., the classification
decision).
Second, for each input node x and each possible outcome, com-
pute the sum, over hidden nodes z with positive weights from x ,
of the product of the weight from x to z and the hidden node’s
score for that outcome computed in step 1; we use the product
(instead of sum) of those weights to reflect the behavior of the prod-
uct in the definition of ai . Thus, s0x =
∑
z max(0,wx→z ) · s0z , and
s1x =
∑
z max(0,wx→z ) · s1z . We found that using max(0,wx→z ) to
effectively drop terms with negativewx→z gives better results than
using the absolute value |wx→z | or simplywx→z . Intuitively, this
is because the input’s contribution to increasing the value of one
output node relative to the other is most important to the outcome.
As useful features, we select Nuf = Fu ·Nf features, where Nf is
the total number of features, and Fu (a parameter of the algorithm)
is the fraction of features to be selected as useful. We initially ex-
perimented with the straightforward approach of selecting the Nuf
features with the highest values of s1x as useful features. However,
this approach sometimes missed some desired useful features. For
example, when a desired feature had the form p=True, where p is a
path, the learned NN might give p=True high weight to s1, or the
NNmight givep=True lower weight to s1 and compensate by giving
its “complementary” feature p=False higher weight to s0; both NNs
can classify feature vectors accurately, and the objective function
does not prefer one of them over the other. To ensure the desired
feature is categorized as useful regardless of which NN is learned
in this and similar situations, we select the 13Nuf features with
the highest values of s0x and the 23Nuf features with the highest
values of s1x . In addition, whenever a feature of the form p=True (or
p=False) is added to the set of useful features, the complementary
feature p=False (or p=True, respectively) is also added to the set of
useful features.
Other approaches to feature ranking. We also experimented with
other approaches to rank features by importance. We tried the Grad-
CAM technique [21] when experimenting with NNs with multiple
hidden layers. It is designed for convolutional neural networks but
can be applied to any NN, since it only requires computing the
gradients of the NN. We also tried an approach inspired by the
backward-propagation based explanation methods in [12], which
rank features by their contribution in determining the NN’s output
for a given feature vector. We adopted this approach by evaluating
the contribution of each feature for each positive-labeled feature
vector. In particular, we used the main feature ranking method
described above, except that for each positive-labeled feature vector,
we ranked only the features whose value is True in that feature
vector. A set of useful features is then determined for each positive-
labeled feature vector. The final set of useful features is the union
of these sets. In our experiments, the approach we adopted works
at least as well as any these alternative approaches.
Extensibility. When extending the policy language with new
operators, the feature selection algorithm requires no changes,
because it treats all features in a generic way. It requires only the
ability to evaluate a feature to a truth value for a given subject and
object.
4.3 Example
We illustrate feature selection on a fragment of Electronic Medical
Record (EMR) sample policy, a ReBAC policy based on the EBAC
policy in [3] and available at [11]. It controls access by physicians
and patients to electronic medical records, based on institutional
affiliations, patient-physician consultations (each EMR is associated
with a consultation), supervisor relationships among physicians,
etc. To keep this example small, we consider here only one rule
in the policy: A physician can create a medical record associated
with a consultation if the physician is not a trainee, the consul-
tation is with the physician, and the patient of the consultation
is registered at the hospital with which the physician is affiliated.
This is expressed as ρ = ⟨Physician, subject.isTrainee=false, Con-
sultation, true, subject = resource.physician ∧ subject.affiliation ∋
resource.patient.registrations, {createMedicalRecord}⟩.
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The relevant run of the feature selection algorithm is for subject
type Physician, resource type Consultation, and action createMedi-
calRecord. For this pair of types, with the path length limits in [6],
there are 474 possible features. We focus on the features f1, f2, and
f3 that appear in ρ and (for illustrative purpose) one feature f4 that
does not, where
f1 = subject.isTrainee = false
f2 = subject = resource.physician
f3 = subject.affiliation ∈ resource.patient.registrations
f4 = subject.consultations.records ⊆ resource.records
The equivalent features optimization discards features such as
atomic condition “subject.consultations.id ∋ {consultation24-1}” and
atomic constraint “subject.consultations.records ⊇ resource.records”.
The discarded features are not included in the above count of pos-
sible features.
Each feature vector corresponding to a subject s and resource r
has the form ⟨ s .id, r .id, value of f1, value of f2, value of f3, value
of f4, . . . ; label⟩. For example, the feature vector for the permitted
SRA-tuple ⟨doc12, consultation2-2, createMedicalRecord ⟩ is ⟨doc12,
consultation2-2, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ; 1⟩.
To illustrate feature ranking, we describe some calculations of
s1x using edge weights in NNPhysician,Consultation,createMedicalRecord;
calculations of s0x are similar. We first compute the contribution of
each hidden node to a permit outcome; for example, for z0,
s1z0 = wz0→y1 −wz0→y0 = 0.0704 − (−0.06070) = 0.1311
Let xi be the input node corresponding to feature fi . By defini-
tion, s1x =
∑
z max(0,wx→z ) · s1z . For feature f2, we have s1x2 =
max(0,wx2→z0 ) ·s1z0 + · · · = max(0, 0.1907) · 0.1311+ · · · = 0.0250+
· · · = 2.1028. For feature f4, we have s1x4 = max(0,wx4→z0 ) · s1z0 +· · · = max(0,−0.0236) ·0.1311+ · · · = 0+ · · · = 0.0492. Based on the
computed values of s1x , f2 is ranked 2 out of 474, and f4 is ranked
347 out of 474, in terms of their contribution to a permit outcome.
With Fu = 0.05 (as in our experiments with FS-SEA*), f2 is selected
as useful, and f4 is not.
5 SIMPLIFIED EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM
Our Simplified Evolutionary Algorithm (SEA) is based on Bui et al.’s
evolutionary algorithm (EA) [6]. It uses context-free grammar ge-
netic programming (CFGGP) [15] to search for high-quality ReBAC
rules.
ReBAC rules are represented in the algorithm as derivation trees
of a context-free grammar (CFG). The main part of EA is preceded
by grammar generation, which specializes the generic grammar of
ORAL to a specific input. The language of the generated grammar
contains rules satisfying the restrictions: (1) constants are limited
to those appearing in the object model, (2) class names and field
names are limited to those appearing in the class model, (3) paths
in conditions and constraints are type-correct, based on the class
model, and satisfy the same length limits as mentioned in Section 4,
and (4) actions are limited to those appearing in the given authoriza-
tions. The grammar generation algorithm pre-computes all atomic
conditions and atomic constraints satisfying these restrictions.
EA’s first phase iterates over the given SRA-tuples (authoriza-
tions), and uses each of the selected SRA-tuples as the seed for
an evolutionary search that adds one new rule to the candidate
policy. Each evolutionary search starts with an initial population
containing candidate rules created from a seed SRA-tuple along
with numerous random variants of those rules together with some
completely random candidate rules, evolves the population by re-
peatedly applying genetic operators (mutations and crossover),
and then adds the highest quality rule in the population to the
candidate policy. Rule quality is measured using the same fitness
function f as [16] (our definition is slightly simplified but equiv-
alent): f (ρ) = ⟨FAR(ρ), FRR(ρ), ID(ρ),WSC(ρ)⟩, where the false
acceptance rate is FAR(ρ) = | [[ρ]] \ uncovAU |, the false rejection
rate is FRR(ρ) = |uncovAU \ [[ρ]] |, uncovAU is the subset of AU
not covered by the current candidate policy, and ID(ρ) equals 2
if the subject condition and resource condition both contain an
atomic condition with path “id”, equals 1 if exactly one of them
does, and equals 0 if neither of them does. The fitness ordering is
lexicographic order on these tuples, where smaller is better. The
first phase ends when the candidate policy covers AU . The second
phase improves the candidate rules by further mutating them, and
then attempts to simplify each rule and merge similar rules.
The set of genetic operators used in the search phase contains:
(1) single mutation: first, randomly select whether to mutate the
subject condition, resource condition, or constraint, then randomly
select a non-terminal N in that part of the derivation tree, and then
randomly re-generate the subtree rooted at N ; (2) double mutation:
same as single mutation, except, in the first step, choose two out
of the three possibilities, and then perform the remaining steps for
both of them; (3) action mutation: in the action set component of the
rule, randomly add or remove actions that subject s can perform on
r according to AU , subject to the restriction that we never remove
the action in the seed tuple for this search; (4) simplify mutation:
remove one randomly selected atomic condition (from the subject
condition or resource condition) or atomic constraint; (5) crossover:
randomly select a non-terminal N in the subtree for the subject
condition, resource condition, or constraint in one parent, find the
same non-terminal in the other parent (if it does not appear, select
a different non-terminal in the first parent), and swap the subtrees
rooted at those two occurrences of N .
The set of genetic operators used in the improvement phase
contains: (1) single mutation; (2) double mutation; (3) type+single
mutation: randomly select whether to replace the subject type,
resource type, or both with their parent types (if those parents
exist), apply a single mutation, check whether the resulting rule is
well-formed (because the unchanged condition or constraint might
be inconsistent with the changed type), and if not, discard it; (4)
type+double mutation: same as type+single mutation, except with
a double mutation instead of a single mutation.
We describe some of the genetic operators as if they directly
manipulate abstract syntax trees, because this description is more
intuitive. However, all genetic operators actually manipulate deriva-
tion trees of the generated grammar.
The improvement phase might seem redundant, because it uses
essentially the same mutations as the first phase. The key difference
is that, in phase 1, the benefit of a mutation is evaluated by its effect
on rule quality, and in phase 2, it is evaluated in the context of the
entire candidate policy by its effect on policy quality. For example,
consider a mutation that transforms a candidate rule ρ into ρ ′, such
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that ρ ′ covers fewer SRA-tuples, has lowerWSC, and has lower rule
quality. If this mutation occurs in phase 1, ρ ′ might survive, but it is
likely to be discarded, due to its lower rule quality. If this mutation
occurs in phase 2, and if the tuples covered by ρ and not by ρ ′ are
also covered by other rules in the candidate policy, ρ ′ will definitely
replace ρ in the candidate policy, because this change reduces the
policy’s WSC and does not change the policy’s meaning.
The main difference between EA and SEA is that we simplified
the step that constructs candidate rules to include in the initial
population, by eliminating one of the sub-steps, namely rule gen-
eralization, which is harder to extend to support new language
features. Rule generalization was responsible primarily for select-
ing a subset of the candidate constraints to include in the candidate
rule. Instead, SEA simply generates a separate candidate rule for
each candidate atomic constraint, and relies on the subsequent evo-
lutionary search to generate a rule with a good subset of candidate
constraints.
Extensibility. SEA can easily be extended to support additional
operators in the policy language. We give generic instructions de-
scribing which parts of the algorithm might need to be modified.
There are several of them, but the required changes are straight-
forward. (1) Extend the functions that generate candidate rules to
support the new operators. Since our algorithm is based on CFGGP,
this basically means extending the context-free grammar to include
the new operators. (2) Extend the function that evaluates conditions
and constraints (to obtain their truth value for a given subject and
object) to handle the new operators. (3) Add rule simplification
transformations specific to the new operators, if any. For example,
when extending the algorithm to support subseteq and set-equality,
we added one simplification: if a constraint contains two atomic
constraints on the same paths, one atomic constraint with supseteq
operator and the other with subseteq operator, then replace them
with a single atomic constraint on the same paths with set-equality
operator. (4) If the new operators may appear in conditions, extend
the rule merge function to handle the new operators, by defining an
appropriate upper bound function, which is used to replace atomic
conditions on the same path in two rules being merged with an
equivalent or looser atomic condition. For example, if we allowed
subseteq in conditions (our current implementation allows it only
in constraints, but we could easily allow it in conditions), then we
would define the upper bound of p ⊆ c1 and p ⊆ c2, where p is a
path and c1 and c2 are constant sets, to be p ⊆ c where c = c1 ∪ c2.
Efficiency and Effectiveness. To ensure that the simplification and
the extensions do not adversely affect the algorithm’s efficiency
or effectiveness, we ran EA and SEA on the university, project
management, and health care sample policies and the workforce
management case study in [6]. For all three sample policies, both
algorithms produce policies that are identical to the simplified
input policies. For the workforce management case study, both
algorithms generate policies with similar quality, as measured by
syntactic similarity (defined in Section 7) to the simplified input
policy. The two algorithms have similar running times for all of
these policies.
6 OVERALL ALGORITHMS
FS-SEA1. Our first algorithm is called Feature Selection—Simplified
Evolutionary Algorithm 1 (FS-SEA1). Its first phase is the feature
selection (FS) algorithm in Section 4 to compute a set of useful
features for each ⟨ subject type, resource type, action ⟩ tuple. Its
second phase is SEA, slightly modified to consider only rules built
from the appropriate set UF of useful features. Specifically, we
modify the function that generates the initial population so that it
uses only features inUF , and we modify the grammar specializa-
tion algorithm to eliminate parts of the grammar corresponding to
atomic conditions and atomic constraints not inUF .
We noticed in experiments with FS-SEA1 that sometimes, when
multiple rules need to be mined for one ⟨ subject type, resource type,
action ⟩ tuple, and one of the desired rules covers only a small subset
of the relevant SRA-tuples in AU , that rule was sometimes not
mined correctly, because the necessary features were not selected
as useful. Since the rule covers a small number of SRA-tuples, the
edge weights associated with the features in it are small (though still
large enough for the NN to correctly classify the SRA-tuples), and
thus those features are given low rankings by our feature selection
algorithm.
Our first approach to overcoming this problem was to modify
our feature selection algorithm to use L1 regularization or L2 reg-
ularization, in the hope that this would boost the ranking of the
desired features. However, this approach was not effective.
Our second approach to overcoming this problem is to perform
feature selection multiple times, so that, each time, it can focus
on identifying the features useful for covering the remaining un-
covered tuples. This approach was much more successful and is
adopted in our second algorithm, described next.
FS-SEA*. Our FS-SEA* algorithm is similar to FS-SEA1, except
that it runs multiple iterations of FS and SEA. In each iteration,
the algorithm runs FS and then SEA, adds to the current mined
policy π only the single highest-quality candidate rule for each ⟨
subject type, resource type, action ⟩ tuple, checks whether the rules
in π together cover all of AU , and if not, starts another iteration,
using AU \ [[π ]] as the set of SRA-tuples to cover (except that, when
checking whether a candidate rule is valid, SEA still uses all of AU ).
This allows each iteration of FS and SEA to focus on the uncovered
SRA-tuples.
Extensibility. When extending the policy language with new
operators, the overall algorithm requires no additional changes
beyond the changes to SEA described in Section 5.
7 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
Our methodology for evaluating policy mining algorithms is de-
picted in Figure 2. It takes a class model and a set of ReBAC rules as
inputs. We generate an object model based on the class model (inde-
pendent of the ReBAC rules), compute the authorizations AU from
the object model and the rules, run the policy mining algorithm
with the class model, object model, and AU as inputs, and finally
compare the mined policy rules with the original (input) policy
rules. If the mined rules are similar to the input rules, the policy
mining algorithm succeeded in discovering the desired ReBAC rules
that are implicit in AU .
SACMAT ’19, June 3–6, 2019, Toronto, ON, Canada Thang Bui, Scott D. Stoller, and Hieu Le
To compare FS-SEA* with Bui et al.’s EA [6], we use the two
ReBAC case study policies in [6], which are available at [11]. The
class models and rules are based on policies of real organizations;
the object models are synthetic. The e-document case study, based
on [9], is for a SaaS multi-tenant electronic-document processing
application. The workforce management case study, based on [10],
is for a SaaS workforce management application provided by a com-
pany that handles the workflow planning and supply management
for product or service appointments. The only change we make is
to omit from the workforce management case study the classes and
7 rules related to work orders, because they involve inheritance,
which our algorithm does not yet support (it is future work).
The policies from [6] do not use the additional constraint op-
erators in our policy language. Therefore, we developed a pseu-
dorandom synthetic policy generator that produces policies that
use these operators (as well as the original ones), and we also use
the synthetic policies for evaluation. Synthetic policies also have
the advantage that their size and complexity are easily controlled.
To make the evaluation results more meaningful, our synthetic
policy generator is carefully designed to produce policies that have
realistic structure, statistically similar in some ways to the realistic
sample policies and case studies in [6].
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Figure 2: Evaluation methodology.
7.1 Synthetic Policy Generation
Class model. The generated class model has the structure shown
in Figure 3. The class model allows generating atomic conditions
and constraints with many combinations of path length(s) and op-
erator; we refer to such a combination as a condition/constraint type.
The class model is designed to support the condition/constraint
types used in the sample policies and case studies in [6] (except for a
few rarely used condition/constraint types), plus condition/constraint
types involving our new constraint operators. In particular, it sup-
ports 10 constraint types and 3 condition types. For example, as-
sociation subOne_i is used to generate atomic constraints with
subject path length 1, resource path length 2, and operator “equal”;
subMany_i is used to generate similar constraints, except with oper-
ator “in”. As another example, DirectSingle class is used to generate
atomic constraints with subject path length 3, resource path length
1, and operator “contains”, and to generate atomic conditions with
path length 2 and operator “in”.
Object model generation. The object model generator is parame-
terized by Nsub , the desired number of instances of each subject
class. The number of instances of each resource class is 5 · Nsub .
The numbers of instances of other classes is fixed at 3. This reflects
a typical structure of realistic policies, in which the numbers of
instances of some classes (e.g., doctors, patients, health records)
scale linearly with the overall size of the organization, while the
numbers of instances of other classes (e.g., departments, medical
specialties) grow much more slowly (which we approximate as
constant).
The values of Boolean fields are chosen randomly. The values
of other fields are randomly chosen object(s) of the appropriate
type. For a field with type C and multiplicity “many”, the number
of chosen objects is randomly chosen to be 1, |C | − 1, or |C |, where
|C | is the total number of instances of class C .
Rule generation. Rule generation uses several numbers and sta-
tistical distributions based on the sample policies and case studies
in [6]. The number of rules in each policy is Nr = 20, which is
the average number of rules in those policies. The rule generator
pseudorandomly chooses a subject type and a resource type using
uniform distributions, and then picks a number nr of rules to gen-
erate for that pair of subject-resource types. nr is chosen to be 1,
2, 3 or 4 with probability of 0.82, 0.12, 0.03, or 0.03, respectively,
based on the frequency distribution in the sample policies and case
studies. The rule generator then chooses the total number of fea-
tures (atomic conditions and atomic constraints) for each rule to be
1, 2, or 3 with probability 0.5, 0.25, or 0.25, respectively, based on
the frequency distribution in the sample policies and case studies.
For each feature, the generator chooses a condition/constraint type,
again based on the frequency distribution in the sample policies
and case studies, and then chooses an atomic condition/constraint
of that type using a uniform distribution. These steps are repeated
until Nr rules have been generated. Finally, we apply simplifyRules
(see Section 5) to the generated rules, since hand-written policies
typically don’t contain unnecessarily complicated rules.
7.2 Policy Similarity Metrics
We evaluate the quality of the generated policy primarily by its
syntactic similarity and per-rule semantic similarity to the original
policy. These metrics are defined in [6] and are normalized to range
from 0 (completely different) to 1 (identical).
Syntactic Similarity. Syntactic similarity measures the fraction
of types, atomic conditions, atomic constraints, and actions that
rules or policies have in common. The Jaccard similarity of sets
is J (S1, S2) = |S1 ∩ S2 | / |S1 ∪ S2 |. The syntactic similarity of rules
ρ1 = ⟨st1, sc1, rt1, rc1, c1,A1⟩ and ρ2 = ⟨st2, sc2, rt2, rc2, c2,A2⟩ is
the average of J ({st1}, {st2}), J (sc1, sc2), J ({rt1}, {rt2}), J (rc1, rc2),
J (c1, c2) and J (A1,A2). The syntactic similarity of rule sets Rules1
and Rules2, SynSim(Rules1, Rules2), is the average, over rules ρ in
Rules1, of the syntactic similarity between ρ and the most similar
rule in Rules2.
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Figure 3: Class model for synthetic policies. Only one subject type Sub_i and one resource type Res_j are shown, but the full
class model contains five of each, i.e., i=1..5. Similarly, there are two MulSingle_k classes, i.e., k=1..2. Note that each resource
class Res_j has two associations, with different multiplicities, to each subject class Sub_i. Names of some associations are
omitted to avoid clutter; each of these associations is implicitly named after the target class, e.g., associations pointing to
Mul2 are named "mul2".
Semantic Similarity. Semantic similarity measures the fraction of
authorizations that rules or policies have in common. The semantic
similarity of rules ρ1 and ρ2 is J ([[ρ1]] , [[ρ2]]). We extend this to
per-rule semantic similarity of policies in exactly the same way that
syntactic similarity of rules is extended to syntactic similarity of
policies. Note that this metric measures similarity of the meanings
of the rules in the policies, not similarity of the overall meanings
of the policies (in our experiments, the original and mined policies
always have exactly the same overall meaning).
8 EVALUATION RESULTS
SEA is implemented in Java. Feature selection is implemented in
Python using the PyTorch deep learning platform. Experiments
were run on Windows 10 on an Intel i7-6770HQ CPU. Our code and
data are available at [11]. For the SEA algorithm, we use the same
parameter values as in [6]. For our feature selection algorithm, we
take the limit on the number of training iterations to beNtr = 10000,
and we set Fu (the fraction of features to be selected as useful) to be
15% for FS-SEA1 and 5% for each feature selection step in FS-SEA*.
We take the number of neurons in the hidden layer to be 64, based
on experiments with a few synthetic policies showing that this is
sufficient to learn perfect classifiers for those policies, while using
32 hidden nodes led to a few mis-classifications.
8.1 Experiments Comparing FS-SEA* with EA
As described in section 7, we use the e-document and workforce
management case studies to compare FS-SEA* and EA. For each
case study, we run both algorithms on 5 object models from [6]
and average the results. For e-document, the algorithms achieve
the same average syntactic similarity (89%), and FS-SEA* achieves
6% higher average per-rule semantic similarity (91% vs. 85%). For
workforce management, EA achieves 2% higher syntactic similarity
(96% vs. 94%), and 1% higher per-rule semantic similarity (98% vs.
97%). We conclude that FS-SEA* and EA are comparably effective
at discovering the desired rules.
The running time of FS-SEA* to run the experiments is higher
than EA. This is because, for the smaller search spaces in these case
studies (|AU | is 2687 for e-document and 1739 for workforce [6,
Table 1]), the overhead of repeated feature selection and repeated
evolutionary search outweighs the potential speedup it can provide.
For the larger synthetic policies (|AU | up to 23124) used in the
experiments in the next section, FS-SEA* is significantly faster than
SEA. This does not show the advantage of FS-SEA* in terms of
running time since search spaces in evolutionary steps of the case
studies are small enough for EA to mine high quality policies. FS-
SEA* spends large amount of time on the FS step trying to reduce
the search space, and repeat the FS-SEA step in multiple iterations
because the algorithm only includes 1 best rule for each tuple of
subject type, resource type and action in each iteration. There are
several tuples that have more than 1 rule in the input policies of
the case studies.
To show the importance of a sufficiently expressive policy lan-
guagewith the operators needed to express a policy in a natural way,
we also run both algorithms on ACLs generated from a synthetic
policy with Nsub = 10 and WSC = 145. Since EA does not support
the operators added to the policy language in this paper, it cannot
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discover the original policy, and using policy similarity to evaluate
the mined policy seems unfair, so we use WSC. We find that EA
produces a much larger policy (WSC = 737) than FS-SEA* (WSC =
144) and takes much longer (155 minutes vs. 5 minutes), because
EA must generate many low-quality rules to cover the permissions
covered by input rules that use the additional operators.
8.2 Experiments Comparing FS-SEA* with
FS-SEA1 and SEA
We generate 5 sets of synthetic rules. For each of them, we gen-
erate a sequence of synthetic object models of varying size, with
Nsub = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30. We run all 3 algorithms on all of them.
Each reported data point is the average over the 5 policies with
the same Nsub . We compare the results for FS-SEA* and SEA to
show the benefits of (iterated) FS; we find that FS-SEA* (and
FS-SEA1) yield significantly better results than SEA for all
metrics: running time, policy similarity (including syntac-
tic similarity and per-rule semantic similarity), and WSC.
We compare results for FS-SEA* and FS-SEA1 to show the ben-
efits of iteration; we find that FS-SEA* yields better results than
FS-SEA1 for policy similarity and WSC, at the expense of slightly
higher running time.
We show the comparisons in two kinds of graphs. One kind
contains 3 curves, one for each algorithm. The other kind contains
two curves, one for the difference between FS-SEA* and SEA, and
one for the difference between FS-SEA* and FS-SEA1. Error bars
(too small to see in some cases) show the standard deviations. The
standard deviations are high in some graphs. While our use of
randomized algorithms (namely, evolutionary search) contributes
to this, the more important contributing factors are that a small
number of samples (namely, 5) was used for each data point in our
experiments, and that the 5 synthetic rule sets used for these 5
samples are not especially similar to each other (our synthetic rule
generation algorithm allows a high degree of random variation).
The x-coordinate in the graphs is the total number of objects in
the object model, denoted Nob jects , except in graphs of running
time, for which the x-coordinate is the average number of autho-
rizations |AU |, because we expect running time to be more strongly
correlated with |AU |.
Running time. The graphs in Figure 4 show that feature selection
reduces running time: both algorithms that include FS are signifi-
cantly faster than SEA, especially for larger policies. The graphs
also show that FS-SEA* takes slightly longer than FS-SEA1, due to
the time needed to repeat feature selection and evolutionary search.
The graphs lack results for SEA for the two largest policy sizes,
because SEA was so slow that we aborted the experiments. We
aborted execution of SEA on the first object model with Nsub = 25
after 23 hours; for comparison, FS-SEA* took about 2.7 hours on
that object model.
The main reason that SEA is slower than FS-SEA* is that, without
feature selection to narrow down the search space, the evolutionary
search produces rules with lower quality, each typically covering
fewer SRA-tuples in AU . Therefore, SEA needs to generate more
rules than FS-SEA* in order to cover all ofAU . This is costly, because
each rule requires two evolutionary searches: one to generate it,
and another to try to improve it.
Policy similarity. The graphs in Figure 5 show that feature se-
lection improves policy similarity. SEA yields average syntactic
similarity of about 0.6 and average per-rule semantic similarity
of about 0.2, while FS-SEA* and FS-SEA1 yield average syntactic
similarity and per-rule semantic similarity in the range of 0.8 to
1.0. Figure 6 (right) shows that FS-SEA* yields an improvement of
about 0.3 in syntactic similarity and an improvement of about 0.8 in
per-rule semantic similarity, compared to SEA. Figure 6 (left) shows
that FS-SEA* achieves slightly better to modestly better results than
FS-SEA1 for both policy similarity metrics for all policy sizes.
WSC. The graph in Figure 7 (left) shows that feature selection
improves WSC. SEA produces policies with WSC roughly in the
range 2500 to 3000, while FS-SEA* produces policies withWSC very
close to the WSC of the input, roughly in the range 140 to 210, and
FS-SEA1 produces policies with WSC somewhat higher but still
below 400. Figure 7 (right) shows the average differences in WSC
ratio, which is the ratio of the WSC of the mined policy to the WSC
of the input policy, for FS-SEA1 and SEA compared to FS-SEA*. We
graph the difference in the WSC ratios, rather than the difference
in the WSCs, since the former should be less dependent on policy
size. This graph emphasizes that FS-SEA* produces the best results
for all policy sizes (the improvement is negligible but positive even
for the smallest policy size in the graph).
9 RELATEDWORK
Related work on ReBAC policy mining. The only prior work on
mining of ReBAC policies (or object-oriented ABAC policies with
path expressions) is by Bui et al. Section 1 discusses the relationship
of our work to their ReBAC mining algorithms in [4, 6]. They also
developed variants of their algorithms for mining ReBAC policies
from incomplete and noisy information about granted permissions
[5], which may typically be obtained from access logs. Their modi-
fications to EA to handle these issues can easily be incorporated in
FS-SEA*.
Related work on ABAC Policy mining. Xu and Stoller proposed
the first algorithm for ABAC policy mining [23], a greedy algo-
rithm that is the basis for Bui et al.’s greedy algorithm for ReBAC
policy mining, discussed in Section 1. Medvet et al. pioneered the
use of evolutionary algorithms for ABAC policy mining [16]; their
work inspired Bui et al.’s evolutionary algorithm for ReBAC pol-
icy mining [6], which our work extends and improves. Iyer et al.
developed the first ABAC policy mining algorithm that can mine
ABAC policies containing DENY rules as well as PERMIT rules
[14]. Their algorithm is relatively expensive: the worst-case com-
plexity is O(N 2EN 5A), where NE is the total number of well-formed
SRA-tuples (whether permitted or denied), and NA is the number
of attributes. Extending our algorithm to support mining DENY
rules is future work.
A few papers have considered the problem of mining ABAC
policies from incomplete (and in some cases noisy) information
about granted permissions; such information is typically obtained
from access logs, so this variant of the problem is often called
“mining from logs”. Xu and Stoller developed a variant of their
greedy algorithm for mining from logs [22]. Mocanu et al. [18]
proposed a different approach that learns a Restricted Boltzmann
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Figure 4: Left: Running time, in seconds, as a function of |AU |. Right: Differences between running times, in seconds, as a
function of |AU |.
Figure 5: Syntactic similarity and per-rule semantic similarity over policies of same size as a function of number of objects.
Machine (RBM) by training on the logs and constructs candidate
rules by sampling from the RBM, and then constructs a policy from
the candidate rules. Their paper presents only preliminary results
from the first phase of their algorithm on one small ABAC policy;
the last phase of the algorithm was not implemented.
Cotrini et al. propose a different formulation of the problem of
mining from logs and an algorithm, called Rhapsody, to solve it [7].
Rhapsody is based on APRIORI-SD, a machine-learning algorithm
for subgroup discovery. Rhapsody’s running time is sensitive to
the number of predicates (conditions and constraints, in our termi-
nology) that can appear in rules. Rhapsody works well when this
number is relatively small, but is already much slower than Xu et
al.’s algorithm [22] for an ABAC policy involving only 16 attributes
(the number of predicates grows with the number of attributes) [5].
Rhapsody can easily be extended to handle path expressions and
therefore to support a form of ReBAC policy mining. However, the
number of predicates is much larger with ReBAC than ABAC (cf.
discussion of state space size in Section 1), and Rhapsody’s running
time would be impractical except on small problem instances.
A top-down approach to ABAC policy mining has also been
pursued, with the goal of using natural language processing and
machine learning to extract ABAC policies from natural language
documents. Since this problem is extremely difficult, the focus so
far has been on sub-problems, such as analyzing natural language
documents to identify the sentences relevant to access control [20]
and the relevant attributes [1].
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